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Abstract
The successful decoding of human genome and subsequent advances in new life
sciences innovation create technological presuppositions of a new possibility of
justice i.e. the just distribution of both social (income, wealth, etc.) and natural
(rationality, intelligence, etc.) goods. Although Rawlsians attempt to expand their
theory to include this new possibility, they fail to provide plausible metrics of social
justice in the genomics and post-genomics era. By contrast, Senians seem to
succeed to do so through their index of basic capabilities. This paper explores what
might be regarded as a Senian perspective of distributive justice in new life sciences
innovation. The argument is that, by comparing freedoms (different functionings)
instead of primary goods, the capability theory allows not only for the identification
of injustices linked to natural lottery but also for their elimination through the use of
new genomic technologies, including gene-based diagnostics, gene therapy, somatic
cell engineering (SCE) and germ-line engineering (GLE). These innovative
technologies seem to have the potential to reduce variability in natural goods and
therefore enable individuals to convert social goods into well-being or welfare.
Introduction
Recent advances in new life sciences innovation, including new diagnostic tools and
genetic interventions (Propp & Moors 2009), challenge the traditional idea of justice
according to which morally arbitrary natural inequalities are given facts that remain
outside the domain of justice. This idea of justice can be traced to John Rawls’s A
Theory of Justice (1971) that is one of the most influential works in moral and political
philosophy. Rawls advanced two principles of justice, the so called ‘equal liberty’ and
the ‘difference principle’, in order to assess the basic structure of society in terms of an
index of social primary goods such as rights, liberties, opportunities, income and
wealth, and the social bases of self-respect (Rawls 1999). However, new life sciences
innovation creates technological preconditions for a new possibility of justice; namely
the just distribution of both social primary goods (income, wealth, etc.) and natural
primary goods (rationality, intelligence, etc.). Although contemporary followers of
Rawls (thereafter Rawlsians) such as Farrelly (2004) and Buchanan et al. (2000) attempt
to expand their theory to include this new possibility, they fail to provide plausible
metrics of social justice in the genomics and post-genomics era. By contrast, Amartya
Sen (2009) and his followers (thereafter Senians) such as Fox (2007) and Cooke (2003)
seem to succeed to do so through their index of basic capabilities. Sen introduced his
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capability approach as an alternative to Rawls’s theory of justice. His focus is no longer
on primary goods but on what people are actually able to do and be, having freedom to
achieve different functionings. This shift of focus makes the capability approach more
open to new life sciences innovation.
This paper critically explores what might be regarded as a Senian perspective of dis-
tributive justice in new life sciences innovation. The argument is that, by comparing
freedoms (different functionings) instead of primary goods, the capability approach
allows not only for the identification of injustices linked to natural lottery but also for
their elimination through the use of new genomic technologies, including gene-based
diagnostics, gene therapy, somatic cell engineering (SCE) and germ-line engineering
(GLE). Although these innovative new technologies are still under development, they
seem to have the potential to reduce variability in natural goods and therefore enable
individuals to convert social goods into well-being or welfare.
This paper is structured as follows: firstly we discuss the failure of Rawlsians to pro-
vide plausible metrics of social justice in the genomics and post-genomics era; secondly,
we examine the advantages and disadvantages of a Senian perspective of distributive
justice in new life sciences innovation; finally we conclude that Sen’s theory, properly
interpreted, is likely to succeed in providing plausible metrics of justice in the new
technological era through an index of basic capabilities.
The problem of rawlsians in the genomics and post-genomics Era
Since the completion of the Human Genome Project (HGP), it has been hard to keep
up with the pace of innovative developments in new life sciences (i.e. genomics and
post-genomics as opposed to genetics) let alone their applications to key sectors of so-
ciety and economy such as human health. In terms of specific technologies, genomics
and post-genomics offer the prospect of development of new gene-based diagnostics
(e.g. pre-implantation genetic diagnosis or PGD) and identification of underlying gen-
etic components of diseases. These innovations are no longer of futuristic kind; they have
already become actualised and well established (Denier 2010). Also the introduction of
personalised medicine promises treatments designed for individual patients (i.e. pharma-
cogenetics) while the development of gene- and cell-based therapies, including gene
therapy and the use of stem cells, create expectations not only for preventing and/or
curing diseases but also for enhancing human beings’ traits and capacities (Gottweis
2002). Genetic enhancements are envisaged through new life sciences innovation,
especially by manipulating DNA and rewriting genetic codes through somatic cell en-
gineering (SCE) and germ-line engineering (GLE)a. These innovative technologies
promise alteration of the genes in all cells in the human body. Finally, the develop-
ment of synthetic biology promises to design and engineer biologically based parts of
novel systems as well as redesigning existing natural biological systems.
As has been already argued elsewhere (Papaioannou 2009), the 21st century life
sciences innovation offers the technological basis of changing prior assumptions about
human nature and thereby introducing a new possibility of justice that goes beyond the
distribution of social goods (e.g. income, wealth, etc.)b. Indeed, the ability to manipulate
DNA and rewrite genetic codes, as well as the possibility of applying engineering prin-
ciples to design new biological systems (i.e. synthetic biology), have increased the
Papaioannou Life Sciences, Society and Policy 2013, 9:5 Page 2 of 13
http://www.lsspjournal.com/content/9/1/5
prospects of intervention in the natural lottery and therefore have changed our percep-
tions of natural goods (e.g. health, vigour, intelligence, imagination, etc.) from matters
of chance to matters of choice (Buchanan 2000). To put it another way, some (morally
significant) natural goods, previously perceived as matters of chance, may soon be
distributable and therefore become matters of choice. As Buchanan et al. (2000) argue
If precise and safe control over the distribution of natural assets becomes feasible, then
those who believe that justice is concerned with effects of natural assets on individuals’
life prospects will no longer be able to assume that justice requires only that we com-
pensate for bad luck in the natural lottery than attacking natural inequalities directly.
Given this new possibility thanks to new life sciences innovation, we must indeed
‘…begin to take seriously the idea that charges of fairness and unfairness can apply to
the distribution of genetic endowments (italics added) (Farrelly 2004).
Although some scholars (Pence 1998; Cooke 2003; Fox 2007) argue that Rawls allows
for the equalisation of natural goods through genetic interventions, some others
(Farrelly 2004) claim that his theory needs to be extended in order to address the new
possibility of justice in the genomics and post-genomics era. In any case, Rawlsians be-
lieve that they have grounds to be concerned with variations in natural goods when
these are not to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. Like all egalitarians,
Rawlsians argue that peoples’ advantage should not be determined by pure bad (brute
or optional) luck (Barclay 2009). Those who are born with poor natural endowments
may be further disadvantaged if they cannot access life science innovations to modify
or boost them. Consider the argument of Colin Farrelly. He urges us to ‘…start thinking
about what demands of justice will be in the post-genetic revolutionary society’
(Farrelly 2004). Farrelly is a Rawlsian thinker in two respects: first, he acknowledges the
importance of primary goods for the theory of justice as fairness; second, he follows
Rawls in dividing such goods into social primary goods (SPG) such as rights and liber-
ties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth, and natural primary goods (NPG)
such as health, vigour, intelligence and imagination.
Both SPG and NPG are things that people are presumed to want (Rawls 1982).
Although there is a clear relationship between them (e.g. there is clear correlation between
good health and high income and wealth in non-welfare societies), Farrelly (2002)
correctly observes that ‘Rawls general conception of justice stipulates that only the SPG
are to be equally distributed, unless unequal distribution of any or all of these values is to
everyone’s advantage. But what about the NPG? Why does Rawls not include the distribu-
tion of them in the principles of justice?’ Farrelly’s answer is this: in Rawls’s theory, the
possession of NPG is influenced by the basic structure. Nevertheless, these goods are not
under the direct control of the basic structure. Farrelly argues that ‘This point is of the
utmost importance when considering how advances in genetic research will revolutionise
debates concerning social justice. For these technologies will make it possible for the dis-
tribution of NPG to be directly (though not totally) under our control’ (Farrelly 2004).
Take for example PGD and gene therapy. The fact that gene screening is now widely avail-
able and gene therapy is improving increases control over the genetic constitution of our
children. On this basis Farrelly (ibid) proposes a revised theory of justice as fairness that in-
corporates Rawlsian principles to govern the just distribution of NPG. His starting point is
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the following: ‘It is no longer viable to invoke the standards of social justice from a world
where it was only the SPG that were directly under the control of the basic structure’.
Farrelly is convinced that the future society will be one where the distribution of NPG
will be, to a large extent, under the control of the basic structure. But of course, as (Denier
2010) stresses ‘…not everything we can control is a matter of justice or injustice. As such,
control is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for justice’. It is necessary to justify
that the NPG controlled by the basic structure are so important for people that they be-
come concerns for justice. But who decides whether health, vigour, intelligence and im-
agination are NPG so important that they become concerns of justice? The presumption
that everyone wants them is philosophical and does not provide full justification. To
achieve full justification would also require some empirical evidence that, for example,
lack of NPG such as intelligence and imagination makes everyone disadvantaged. On this
issue Farrelly appears to be silent. Instead he raises the issue of principles which should
govern the just distribution of NPG.
As an answer, (Farrelly 2004) (ibid: 81) proposes a ‘genetic difference principle’ (GDP).
This principle states: inequalities in the distribution of genes important to the NPG
are to be arranged so that they are to be the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.
Farrelly explicitly recognises that total control of the distribution of NPG would be
impossible. What would be possible is advances in new life sciences innovation would
enable the ‘fair’ distribution of genes (i.e. genetic justice) and this would influence
NPG. It might be argued that there are several problems with the application of
Farrelly’s GDP. First of all, the maintenance of distinction between NPG and SPG over-
looks the sociological fact that human beings are anyway reproduced through some
sort of ‘selective breeding’. For example, social, political and economic factors influence
who marries and reproduces with whom, and thereby determines the range of genetic
endowments. Also social choices determine the size, shape and gender balance of pop-
ulations and therefore also NPG. The ability to offer genetic interventions by means of
new life sciences innovation is yet another place of social influence into the genetic
endowments of human beingsc.
Secondly, even if we assume that Farrelly’s GDP is plausible and applicable, it is not
clear which individuals qualify as members of the worst-off group of society (Papaioannou
2009). For instance, Lindsay (2005) insists that severely cognitively impaired individuals
qualify as members of the least advantaged group and for this reason they should be given
priority over other genetically disadvantaged groups. But it is not clear why this should be
the case. Why should some genetically disadvantaged group be given priority over other
genetically disadvantaged groups? Nor is it clear why victims of genetic diseases should be
given priority over victims of socio-economic circumstances (e.g. those born in poverty).
Farrelly’s reply to prioritarians such as Lindsay is that the interests of different disadvan-
taged groups need to be balanced one against another. The GDP is not strict and there-
fore does not trump those principles that govern the distribution of SPG.
Farrelly allows for a more ‘lax’ interpretation of GDP.
This interpretation stipulates that genetic inequalities should be arranged so that they
are to the greatest reasonable benefit of the least advantaged (Farrelly 2004).
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In fact, the lax GDP compromises genetic justice against other legitimate claims of
justice. In addition, society should decisively deal with the issue of ‘which genetically
disadvantaged group should be given priority over other genetically disadvantaged
groups’. Farrelly’s argument is plausible but fails to address the epistemological problem
that is at the heart of prioritarian investigations: how can we know who is the least
advantaged in terms of NPG? Farrelly (2008) offers the strategy to define the ‘least
advantaged’ as ‘…those individuals whose genetic constitutions place them below half
of the median for expected life time acquisition of natural primary goods’. This strategy
does not focus on individual genetic constitutions but rather on their consequences for
the acquisition of natural primary goods. It might be argued that there are two prob-
lems with Farrelly’s strategy: first of all, it is not clear how the expected life time acqui-
sition of natural primary goods will be determined (expectations might vary across
different societies); secondly, Farrelly’s strategy focuses on the consequences of genetic
constitutions and not on genetic constitutions as such (this means it ignores the possi-
bility of non-genetic determinism i.e. acquisition or non-acquisition of natural primary
goods mainly as a result of social and economic conditions).
Thirdly, the lax GDP considers ‘genes’ and genetic endowments to be (genetic) re-
sources. This is mistaken for two reasons. Firstly, equalisation of genetic resources
might leave people who live in poor economic and social conditions (e.g. poverty)
worse off than others because of negative gene-environment interactions. Secondly,
as Cooke points out, ‘If genetic endowments are interpreted as resources, one may
be inclined to redistribute as much as possible and be as ‘charitable’ as possible, go-
ing well beyond disease prevention, and into enhancement, where height, good
looks, physical strength and intelligence, would be considered generous endowments
of resources for one’s future descendants (Cooke 2003).’ The problem is that one’s genes
and genetic endowments cannot easily change. If they change by means of new life sci-
ence innovations such as GLE they may affect future generations. But, of course, one gen-
eration cannot know which genetic endowments or traits would be best for future
generation simply because one cannot predict what the conditions would be in the future.
According to Cooke ‘…the further moral problem is that in enhancing these ‘goods’, par-
ents make choices for future generations by casting their own values into their world’
(Cooke 2003).
Fourthly, the lax GDP considers ‘genes’ to be the only plausible currency of genetic
justice without taking account of the biological and conceptual complexities involved in
the distribution of genes. As Fox stresses, complex traits, including health, vigor,
intelligence and imagination, ‘…are embedded and developed through robust interplay
of heredity and environment and their biological input is a complex function of multi-
plicity relating genes, which is highly unlikely to be directly manipulable through bio-
technology intervention at any point in the near future. Beyond the causal complexities
of multigenecity and gene-environment interaction, there remain conceptual complex-
ities as to both the socio-economic desirability of a particular trait within a given sys-
tem of social arrangements, and also the moral desirability of a trait by reference to the
plurality of worldviews with that system’ (Fox 2007). The complexity of genes (and es-
pecially their interaction with the external environment), disqualify them from being
the currency of new distributive justice. This implies that the lax GDP is impossible to
be applied, equalising genes that are important to NPG.
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A senian perspective of distributive justice in New life sciences innovation
If it is true that Rawlsians such as Farrelly fail to provide plausible metrics of justice
(i.e. genes important to NPG distributed according to the lax GDP) in the genomics
and post-genomics era, is it also true that Senians such as Cooke (2003) and
Fox (2007) succeed to provide better metrics through the capabilities approach? If the
answer is yes then what might be regarded as a Senian perspective of distributive just-
ice in the era of new life science innovation?
In the Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Sen (1980) asserts that what matters in the
discussion of social justice is not the question ‘why equality’ but the question ‘equality
of what?’ Answering this latter question provides the currency of Senian justice which
is capability. The capability approach shifts focus from the basic structure of society to
the basic freedoms of people. Sen is critical of Rawlsian principles because they become
central issues in judging resource-based distributional equity. In this sense, he suggests
there is an element of ‘fetishism’ in those principles (Sen 1980). In Sen’s view, resources
are merely the means to freedom for people to choose different kinds of life. As Sen
(1980) explains:
Justice cannot be indifferent to the lives that people can actually live. The importance of
human lives, experiences and realisations cannot be supplanted by information about
institutions that exist and the rules that operate … We have reason to be interested …
in the freedoms that we actually have to choose between different kinds of lives.
This is what the notion of capability refers to: each individual’s actual freedom to
achieve the functioning he/she values (leading an autonomous and meaningful life).
Sen arrives at the notion of capability partly through his critical assessment of Rawlsian
primary goods. Sen’s dissatisfaction with Rawlsian primary goods is founded upon the
notion that some individuals are differently capable of converting them into well-being
or welfare because of variations in a range of factors, including biology, physical envir-
onment and social conditions. For example, disabled people cannot achieve the same
level of well-being as non-disabled people with the same amount of primary goods.
Primary goods as such do not matter; they cannot (and should not) be thought as the
currency of egalitarian justice (Cohen 1989). What matters is what individuals are able
to do with them. For Sen the ultimate concern is not primary goods as such but cap-
abilities which are the result of relations between persons and goods and physical envir-
onment, and social conditions. Capabilities imply the importance of the freedom
dimension of human life.
The distributive objective of the capability approach is to guarantee all individuals ac-
cess to the basic abilities required for the achievement of essential functionings so that
no one falls below the relevant baseline into what Sen calls a state of ‘capability
deprivation’. Above that baseline it seems that individuals bear responsibility for their
choice of non-essential functionings. Although Sen prioritises freedom over responsibil-
ity, the latter seems to be important for understanding one crucial aspect of the cap-
ability approach: individuals who have the capability to achieve essential functionings
but choose not to do so or individuals who choose certain non-essential functionings
cannot justify and sustain complains about essential functionings achievement-failure.
Such individuals do not lack the capabilities and so there is no reason to complain or
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transfer resources from those who have chosen essential functionings to those who
have chosen non-essential functionings. Even though Sen never takes a clear position
on this issue, he defends substantive freedom of choice that can never be separated
from responsibility. As he says
Freedom to choose gives us the opportunity to decide what we should do, but with
that opportunity comes the responsibility for what we do – to the extent that they
are chosen actions. Since the a capability is the power to do something, the ac-
countability that emanates from ability – that power – is a part of the capability
perspective … (Sen (1980)
Certainly, to know how many of an individual’s functionings were a result of his/her
choice and how many a result of unchosen circumstances, we would have to know de-
tails about that person’s situation. Collecting data about a person raises a number of
ethical issues, including what Wolff (1998) regards as ‘shameful revelation’ i.e. ‘…one
may find certain facts about oneself shameful, and not wish to reveal them’ Sen (1980).
Shameful revelation can lead to lower respect-standing and therefore undermine egali-
tarian ethos. The capability approach does not demand investigation into one’s essential
functionings achievement-failure. That is to say, one is not required to admit he/she is
a failure because he/she finds it difficult to achieve essential functionings, when there is
no difficulty for other, equally capable, individuals.
In Sen’s theory, the notion of responsibility includes the element of voluntariness. In-
dividuals are responsible for the non-essential functionings they have voluntarily
chosen (from n-tuples) as capable actors. In fact, Sen assumes responsibility in every
individual choice. For this reason he insists that ‘In dealing with responsible adults, it is
more appropriate to see the claims of individuals on the society (or the demands of
equity or justice) in terms of freedom to achieve rather than actual achievements’
(Sen 1995). Although freedom as such is not an absolute value in Sen’s theory, it is a
value of primary importance or fundamental value. Indeed freedom is the bottom of
everything. According to Fleurbay (2006) ‘Typically, even when freedom is deemed
important one would still look at achievements as well’. Achievements constitute con-
sequences of the capability approach. Therefore, they cannot be totally ignored by
Sen’s evaluative system.
The components of responsibility and freedom within the capability approach make
it attractive to those who defend justice in new life sciences innovation. Thus,
according to (Cooke 2003) ‘Amartya Sen’s capability theory can be used as a framework
to ensure freedom and equality in the use of GLE technology’. The latter is a new life
sciences innovation that might be used for genetic interventions (i.e. interventions in
human genes) in order to provide the biological basis of certain basic human capabil-
ities. In this sense the focus here is neither on genes nor on NPGs. None of these has
an intrinsic value. Instead, the focus here is on the freedom of people to choose among
combinations of functionings. Genes and NPGs can help one achieve more freedom.
Therefore, they might be only viewed as means to freedom (Sen 1980). But as Sen
stresses, means cannot be valued independently of ends (Sen 1980). Since genes and
NPGs cannot be valued for their own sake, their dependence on the valuation of cap-
abilities has to be acknowledged. In the case of GLE technology, the valuation of
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interventions in human genes that influence NPGs depends on the valuation of actual
functionings. That is the extent of freedom that can be achieved by means of NPGs
(influenced by GLE interventions in human genes).
Certainly, Cooke (ibid) seems to overlook one important issue: Sen’s theory is not ne-
cessarily about intergenerational justice (although it does not exclude intergenerational
justice) while GLE is about irreversible changes into genetic material and this can affect
both future states of well-being and future generations. What if those changes com-
promise current persons’ ability to secure future states of well-being? What if those
changes prove to be undesirable to future persons? The answer seems to be that even if
GLE based changes prove to be undesirable for some current and future persons, these
persons can still make a responsible choice not to convert them into actual function-
ings (even if they are capable of doing so). In other words, future generations can re-
sponsibly choose to achieve functionings different from those based on undesirable
GLE changes. As Wolff (2009) acknowledges it is indeed ‘…possible to have a capability
to achieve a functioning, yet choose not to do so’. This is because there is a distinction
between functionings and capabilities. Functionings focus on what persons actually
choose to achieve. By contrast, capabilities focus on the alternatives persons have
(Anand et al. 2005). To be capable of certain functionings does not mean that persons
necessarily choose to achieve them (persons might choose from a set of alternatives).
Although it is true that we cannot know enough to secure the well-being of future gen-
erations, this is not a problem for the capability approach to justice.
Ensuring capabilities through GLE and other new life science technologies is a justice
enhancing as it gives people the choice to express their genes, converting them into
functionings. This possibility of choice of future generations also makes genetic inter-
ventions defensible in the present. The justification being that no matter how desirable
or undesirable such interventions will be for future generations, it is the future genera-
tions who will make the choice about which to convert into actual functionings.
Basic human capabilities have both biological and social determinants. As (Cooke
2003) stresses ‘Social and environmental influences, personal choices, and hard work
should not be underestimated. These factors have always been great competitors to
generate predispositions in enabling people to achieve their goals and overcome genetic
inequalities’. Indeed, as Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) and Brock (2000) also confirm,
where one stands in the socio-economic hierarchy and the degree of socio-economic
inequality affect health.
The biological and social determinants of human capabilities imply that a Senian per-
spective of justice requires provision of a decent minimum of both genetic goods and
social goods so that people are able to choose among combinations of functionings.
Therefore, it is neither the genetic goods nor the social goods that directly contribute
to well-being. Rather, it is the capabilities which constitute and contribute to well-being
. For this reason the role of society and government is to provide different means
(including life sciences innovation and policies of social and economic redistributon) in
order to bring people up to at least a minimum threshold of capabilities. Some people
might need serious genetic interventions (by means of new life sciences) in order to
arrive at the minimum threshold while some other people might need serious social
interventions in order to arrive at the same threshold or even both (genetic and social
interventions). The Senian perspective of distributive justice also allows for the gene-
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environment interaction to be taken seriously on board in order to bring people up to
at least a minimum threshold of capabilities. The gene-environment interaction has im-
pact on whether people are capable of achieving certain functionings. For instance,
common diseases such as heart disease and cancer depend on this complex interaction
and prevent people from being able to achieve good health.
Despite the fact that the Senian perspective deflects attention from natural (primary)
and social (primary) goods to what those goods and their interaction do for people, it
never specifies what sort of capabilities can be considered as basic capabilities in the
genomics and post-genomics era. Sen leaves the notion of basic capabilities open to in-
terpretation. According to him ‘The capability approach is a general approach, focusing
on information on individual advantages judged in terms of opportunity rather than
specific ‘design’ for how society should be organised’ Sen (1980). This generality and
openness forced Senians such as Nussbaum (2000) to provide the following interper-
sonal and comparable index of basic capabilities:
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length…
2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health…
3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place…
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think
and reason…
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people…
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in
critical reflection…
7. Affiliation. A. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognise and show
concern for other human beings…B. Having the social bases of self-respect and
non-humiliation; being able to be treated as dignified being…
8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants
and world of nature..
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities…
10. Control over One’s Environment. A. Political. Being able to participate effectively
in political choices that govern one’s life…B. Material. Being able to hold property
(both land and movable goods)…
Nussbaum recognises that some items on her philosophically constructed index of
capabilities are or include what Rawls called natural primary goods but stresses that the
determinants of those goods are natural or luck-governed. In fact, as pointed out else-
where (Papaioannou 2009), she is not open to (or she ignores) life sciences innovation
and therefore she argues that ‘In these areas, what government can aim to deliver is the
social basis of these capabilities…’. Nussbaum (2000) takes the example of women’s
emotional health. She insists that ‘…government cannot make all women emotionally
healthy; but it can do quite a lot to influence emotional health through suitable policies
in areas such as family law, rape law and public safety. Something similar will be true
for all the natural goods’ Nussbaum (2000).
Nussbaum’s view that government can only be indirectly involved in the distribution
of natural or luck governed goods does not seems to go far in the genomics and post-
genomics era. What if government came up with suitable policies of equal access to life
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sciences innovations (including GLE) that could improve the biological bases of natural
goods? To put it another way, what if society as a whole could guarantee both the bio-
logical and the social bases of basic capabilities?
Most of the basic capabilities in Nussbaum’s index reveal a strong genetic com-
ponent. As (Fox 2007) observes ‘…they are closely correlated with physical, mental
and behavioural goods among the natural primary goods. Physical goods such as
absence of disability and resistance against disease, for example, form important
genetic basis for capabilities, such as being able to have good health, move about
freely, and live out a worthwhile life of normal length’. For Fox a Senian perspec-
tive of distributive justice in the genomics and post-genomics era implies a decent
genetic minimum that consists of a biological constitution that provides whatever
internal components necessary for people to function at adequate level in each of
the basic capabilities. Whenever there is a mismatch between biology and basic
capabilities, there is a requirement of justice to alter biology (or gene-
environmental interactions) so that people can be brought up to adequate level of
functioning.
This perspective seems to be more about treatment than enhancement. Treatment and
enhancement are difficult to distinguish (Levitt & O’Neill 2010), but a line might be drawn
between them for the sake of capability theory. According to Mehlman et al. (2011)
enhancement is ‘An intervention that employs medical and biological technology
to improve performance, appearance or capability besides what is necessary to
achieve, sustain, or restore health’. By contrast, an intervention that aims to treat
or mitigate the effects of a disease would qualify as treatment. Certainly, as
Green (2005) stresses, between treatment and enhancement lies a third category
‘prevention’. ‘Unlike … treatment… prevention is an intervention that alters an
individual’s condition beyond what is normal for the species, but it does so in
order to reduce person’s risk of suffering disease’ (Fox 2007). Although both
treatment are prevention are based on a controversial approach to disease as a
deviation from species-typical functions (Resnik 2006), the list of basic capabil-
ities seems to correspond to these functions. For example, the capability of life
corresponds to the human species function or ability to live a life as this has be-
come typical or normal through natural selection (Daniels 1985). From this it fol-
lows that healthy people are capable of life. Therefore to perform genetic
interventions (by means of life science innovations) to enhance otherwise healthy
people is not justified by the outlined Senian perspective of justice. What is justi-
fied is genetic intervention to either prevent or treat diseases that result in a
state of basic capability deprivation. Although some (Lenox 1995) might argue
that such intervention is still a form of enhancement (as indeed all medicine is),
the Senian perspective can allow it only if it can bring people above a decent
minimum of basic capability deprivation. In this sense, it might be argued that a
decent minimum of basic capability deprivation constitutes an equilibrium point.
Any genetic intervention beyond that point (aiming at unlimited capability devel-
opment) can be considered as enhancement and therefore can be rejected on the
grounds that it increases inequality. By contrast, any genetic intervention up to
that point (aiming at basic capability development) can be considered as treat-
ment and therefore can be promoted on the grounds that it reduces inequality.
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According to (Fox 2007) the first principle of the Senian perspective is the
following:
1) Natural primary goods are to be distributed so as to (contribute the heredity bases
of crucial human functioning that) bring individual off-spring up above a decent
minimum of internal basic capability deprivation.
Fox stresses that this first principle is sufficientarian. However, it says nothing about
inequality of capabilities of those individuals above the decent genetic minimum. In
order to go beyond sufficientarianism, he introduces a second principle:
2) Natural primary goods are to be distributed (so as to contribute the heredity base
of crucial human functioning that is) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.
This second principle is prioritarian and supposedly deals with the problem of
inequality of capabilities of individuals above the decent genetic minimum. As long as
such inequality does not threaten sufficiency, it can be justified within the Senian per-
spective. In fact, similarly to Farrelly’s GDP, Fox’s prioritarianism ignores physical com-
plexities such as gene-environment interaction.
Although Fox’s hybrid distributive theory correctly identifies the limitations of the
basic capability approach, it fails to provide a coherent alternative. There are two main
reasons for this: first, it is unclear which primary goods ought to be distributed to the
least advantaged after the point at which everyone has been brought above a decent
genetic minimum; second, Fox tries to bring together the Rawlsian and the Senian per-
spectives without acknowledging that each of these perspectives has a its own unique
currency of justice.
As has been already said, the capability approach is informational. One might use this
approach to evaluate inequalities that have both genetic and social causes but not sign
up to specific public policies aimed at equating genetic goods through the use of life
sciences innovation. According to Sen (1980)‘…in judging the aggregate progress of so-
ciety, the capability approach would certainly draw attention to the huge significance of
the expansion of human capabilities of all members of the society, but it does not lay
down any blueprint for how to deal with conflicts between, say, aggregative and distri-
butional considerations …’. Sen is clear that the informational nature of the capability
approach is crucial for making the right decisions about public policy interventions. As
he says ‘…the choice of an informational focus – a concentration on capabilities – can
be quite momentous in drawing attention to the decisions that would have to be made
and the policy analysis that must take account of the right kind of information’ Sen
(1980). From this it follows that specific (scientific) information about the relationship
between genetic inequality and environment and basic capability deprivation can draw
attention to the need for specific decisions and policies for integrated interventions e.g.
social interventions through re-distribution of income and genetic interventions
through gene therapy or GLE. Such interventions might reduce inequality not so much in
SPGs and NPGs, but in ‘…relations between superior and inferior persons’ (Anderson
1999). Properly understood, egalitarianism opposes hierarchical social relations. In her
critique of Rawlsians and other luck egalitarians, Anderson clearly stresses that the point
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about egalitarianism is to ‘…seek a social order in which persons stand in relations of
equality. They seek to live together in a democratic community as opposed to hierarchical
one’ Sen (1980). By preventing people from arriving at a state of basic capability
deprivation through both social and genetic interventions, Senians are likely to succeed
eliminating oppressive social and political relations. Redistribution of income, gene ther-
apy or GLE might be crucial for enabling some people to function as equal citizens.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have tried to explore a Senian perspective of justice in new life sciences
innovation. I have argued that, given the failure of Rawlsians to provide plausible met-
rics of justice in the genomics and post-genomics era, Senians, by comparing freedoms
instead of primary goods, allow for the elimination of natural lottery injustices through
life science innovation, including GLE. Otherwise these injustices might result in a state
of basic capability deprivation. The outlined Senian perspective needs to be further
elaborated in order for us to come up with capability based metrics of justice in the
genomics and post-genomics era.
Endnotes
aSomatic cells are mainly skin or muscle cells, they contain 23 chromosomal pairs
and do not transmit genetic information to future generations. By contrast, germ-line
cells are the egg and sperm cells, they contain 23 chromosomes and transmit genetic
information to offspring as well as to future generations (see F. Allhoff. Germ-line Genetic
Enhancement and Rawlsian Primary Goods. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 2005;
15(1): 39–56). Germ-line engineering of the human genome might become technically
feasible in less than a decade since some specific techniques already exist and have been
demonstrated in animals (see M. Lappé. 2006. Ethical Issues in Manipulating the Human
Germ Line. In Bioethics: An Anthropology. H. Kuhse and P. Singer eds. Oxford. Blackwell.
bThis, in fact, sketches a move from ‘fate’ to ‘responsibility’ i.e. responsibility for just
distribution of natural goods.
cThis critical point was made by one of this journal’s referees. I would like to thank
him/her for his/her contribution.
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